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The enforcement program of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission is an important means by which the Commission moves
towards the objectives of improved capital markets and the preven-
tion of fraud. The regulatory authority under which the Commission
is authorized to perform its enforcement activities prescribes that
where "it appears that there may be violation of the acts adminis-
tered by the Commission or the rules and regulations thereunder, a
preliminary investigation is generally made."' If, as a result of this
investigation, it appears that a violation has been or is about to be
committed, the Commission may then order a formal investigation.2
If the investigation reveals that a violation has taken place the
Commission can institute administrative proceedings looking to the
imposition of remedial sanctions, initiate injunctive proceedings, or
refer cases to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.3
Thus, except for this last alternative, the SEC enforcement program
is designed to maintain the integrity of the market place and deter
fraud, rather than to punish wrongdoers.
While the regulatory language is clear and its authorizations
broad, the Commission has limited resources and finds it impossible
to investigate and prosecute every violation. Consequently, the
Commission has sought in recent years to focus its enforcement
efforts at key points where maximum impact can be achieved. For
this reason, enforcement efforts involving professionals, such as ac-
countants and lawyers, have been important even though the num-
ber of cases in which professionals were so involved has not been
great. The reasoning of the Commission is simple: these profession-
als are an essential element in providing access to the market place,
*Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities and Exchange
Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication by any
of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
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since the sale of securities cannot take place without their involve-
ment. Professional responsibility at these points of access can pre-
vent many questionable activities before they occur.
The enforcement program as it relates to professional accoun-
tants, therefore, is part of the Commission's broad effort to encour-
age improved professional performance. By insisting upon high
standards of performance by accountants, more reliable and mean-
ingful financial information for the investing public will be assured.
This information is the cornerstone of the analytical process
whereby sound investment decisions can be made.
It must be understood that enforcement is only one part of the
Commission's program to improve the quantity and quality of infor-
mation available to the public. The regulatory authority granted the
Commission is used extensively, and the potential of its further use
has proved a valuable incentive to the development of corrective
institutions within the private sector. Regulation and exhortation
alone, however, are not enough. An enforcement program has
proved to be an essential ingredient in the process and it must be
understood as such.
It should be emphasized that the enforcement program is not
used as a vehicle by which fundamentally new professional stan-
dards are established. The present generally accepted auditing stan-
dards of adequate technical training, independence of mental atti-
tude, due professional care, adequate planning and supervision and
sufficient competent evidential matter, are perfectly adequate to
assure sound auditing if conscientiously applied to each case.4 In
addition, the fundamental accounting principle of fair presentation
under the particular circumstances of each case remains the basis
for good financial reporting.
I. THE OBJECTIVES
A. Giving Effect to Auditing Standards
Within the above broad standards the Commission's enforce-
ment program deters shoddy performance by the increased risk of a
Commission injunctive action and private actions for money dam-
ages.
As a result it becomes desirable for individuals and firms to
devote greater resources and more care to the avoidance of such
performance. While professionals in general have a desire to do a
good job, excellence is costly, and in a world of competing claims
4. See 1 CCH AICIA PROF. STANDS., SAS No. 1, AU § 150.02 (1972).
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and equities, a program which raises the cost of deficient work
should have the impact of improving performance. On an individual
firm basis, an injunctive action should restrain a repetition of the
conduct in question and require inproved compliance with profes-
sional standards while subjecting those responsible to prosecution
if there is a repetition of the unacceptable behavior. On a profession-
wide basis, the threat of an enforcement action and the costs of an
adverse determination by a court-unfavorable publicity, possible
civil judgments, the financial burden of litigation, and, ultimately,
a loss of professional stature with a consequent decline in busi-
ness-all combine to reduce the likelihood of defective professional
performance.
B. Encouragement of Quality Control Procedures
It is also intended that the Commission enforcement actions
encourage the implementation of profession-wide quality controls
within firms. Examples of these initial controls are: procedures in-
volving recruitment, training and promotion of a highly competent
professional staff, specific review procedures governing engage-
ments, and internal audit systems by which the management of a
firm can be assured these controls are working adequately. In recent
years, accounting firms have been devoting substantial resources to
all of these types of procedures, and professional standards are giv-
ing recognition to their importance.5
General procedures assuring adequate professional staff proba-
bly are of the greatest importance, because competent, well-trained
professionals with an alert and independent attitude are the key to
effective auditing. If the staff in the field and the partner in charge
of an engagement do not have these attributes, it is unlikely that
specific review procedures will provide assurance of a good audit.
On the other hand, well designed review procedures are useful
in reducing the danger to the public and the firm of an error or
faulty judgment by one or a few individuals. These procedures
should be designed to disclose breakdowns within the audit and
provide a mechanism for their correction before a report is issued.
They may include formal steps by which various levels of workpaper
review are undertaken by audit personnel on an engagement. Addi-
tional procedures include: provisions for consultation as problems
arise, a means by which staff persons who disagree with judgments
reached by an engagement partner may bring these matters to the
5. See, e.g., AICPA SAS No. 4, "Quality Control Considerations for a Firm of Indepen-
dent Auditors," Dec. 1974.
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attention of senior persons in the firm; independent reviews of
financial statements and summary workpapers by a partner or tech-
nical staff member not directly responsible for the engagement; and
the use of industry specialists.
Finally, quality control systems within firms include an after
the fact "internal audit" system designed to provide assurance to
the management of the firm that adequate audits are being done
and that timely review procedures are achieving their objectives.
This system normally encompasses post-audit reviews on a sample
basis utilizing personnel from other offices or a designated central
quality assurance group for the firm as a whole.
In response to Commission actions, actions by private litigants,
and some generally perceived public concern about the adequacy of
audits, accounting firms have been increasing substantially their
commitment of resources to all forms of improved quality controls.
It is hoped that this investment will result in fewer auditing errors
and a substantial reduction in the frequency of future enforcement
actions. In those cases in which errors still occur, review procedures
will lessen the likelihood that these errors will go undetected and
result in the auditor's acceptance of misleading financial reporting.
C. Improving Auditing Standards
In addition to encouraging better quality controls, enforcement
actions may have the benefit of directing attention to areas in which
auditing standards may be more effectively articulated and applied.
Although Commission actions are based on the facts of particular
cases, in some situations the facts may be typical of general problem
areas, and Commission opinions, orders, and complaints may em-
phasize audit deficiencies that require profession-wide attention.
In one recent opinion,' for example, the Commission set forth
in considerable detail its view of a deficient audit in which transac-
tions with related parties played a major role. In the same opinion,
comments were made by the Commission with respect to relation-
ships between predecessor and successor auditors that the Commis-
sion believed were inadequate in the particular case. Both areas are
now being considered by the Auditing Standards Executive Com-
mittee of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
[AICPA], which is attempting to articulate specific guidelines to
be applied in these areas. In addition, the Commission's emphasis,
in a number of cases, on overall fairness in financial reporting has
6. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974), 4 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
72,175, at 62,399.
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communicated to the profession the Commission's expectation that
accountants' responsibilities go beyond the mechanical application
of defined accounting principles.
D. Improving Public Confidence
The Commission is aware of the overall impact on public opin-
ion of the enforcement program, and to this end a major objective
is to increase the level of public confidence in financial reporting. If
this is to be achieved, there must be greater confidence in the ac-
counting profession and in the reporting environment. The investor
must be assured that redress will be achieved in situations where
deficiencies are found to exist. While some accountants suggest that
confidence in the public accounting profession would be enhanced
if all actions against accountants were kept private and many were
not brought at all, this is a short-sighted view. As the level of profes-
sional performance rises, the public must be persuaded that an
overwhelming majority of public accountants do a good job and that
in those cases where they do not, vigorous action will be taken by
public agencies to call them to task. A cover-up of deficient profes-
sional performance, no matter how justified, will ultimately tend to
erode rather than enhance public confidence.
Confidence in the SEC is an important part of this total pack-
age that also must be considered. If investors are satisified that the
Commission, as the principal regulatory agency in the area, is alert
and effective in discovering abuses and bringing effective sanctions
against those involved in significant wrongdoing, there will be an
increase in the level of investor confidence in financial reporting.
While it is conceivable that an excessive number of such suits might
erode public confidence, the temporary building of confidence
through a process of deluding the public as to the reality of the
situation would be far more destructive when the facts of the matter
finally emerge.
At the same time, the need for public confidence in the SEC
serves as a deterrent against the Commission bringing enforcement
actions in marginal cases where the auditor involved was guilty of
a simple error in judgment that was not particularly egregious. Al-
though such errors might create some legal responsibility to private
litigants, it does not seem desirable for the Commission to bring an
enforcement action every time it may conclude that an auditor has
made a mistake.
I. THE APPROACH
In deciding whether to institute an enforcement action, the
1975]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Commission considers the case in light of several major factors,
including the seriousness of the professional deficiency and the ex-
tent to which the auditor had knowledge of what was happening.
The Commission also considers the degree to which the auditor
appeared to be an active participant in a scheme to mislead the
public through artful or incomplete disclosure or through the crea-
tive selection of accounting principles designed to present a picture
inconsistent with reality. All factors relevant to the particular case
must be considered.
In this connection, it should be emphasized that there are many
enforcement actions brought by the Commission involving deficient
financial reporting in which auditors are not named as defendants.
In fact, auditors are named only in a minority of such cases. The
Commission does not have a policy of pursuing all professional defi-
ciencies that can be found simply for the joy of the hunt. Selectivity
in the use of resources and attention to the more serious cases are
keys to an effective program.
Because of the selectivity in bringing cases, it must be recog-
nized that the failure to name an auditor in a case does not necessar-
ily represent an endorsement of the job done. The Commission
sometimes concludes that while an auditor has done less than would
have been hoped, the performance does not warrant a formal action.
In such situations, the Commission sometimes instructs the staff to
request that the management of the accounting firm involved come
in for an informal conference. At such a conference, the manage-
ment is advised that although no action is being instituted, the
Commission does not feel that the level of performance in the case
was up to the standards it believes the profession should achieve.
The management is then questioned with regard to remedial actions
taken by the firm to improve future performance. In this way, ap-
propriate corrective action can be encouraged in marginal cases
without formal proceedings.
A. Sanctions
The sanctions imposed in Commission proceedings must serve
a remedial purpose for firms in which improvements in the quality
of work can reasonably be anticipated. In other cases, it is necessary
to protect the public from continued practice before the Commis-
sion by unqualified persons and firms. Some circumstances arise in
which it must be concluded that the performance of particular indi-
viduals or firms is so deficient that their continued practice before
the Commission in the public market place carries too great a risk
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and hence is unacceptable. While small firms have more commonly
been involved in such cases, a consistent pattern of deficient work
by a large firm might lead to a conclusion that its continued practice
would expose the public to greater risks than the Commission could
reasonably deem to be acceptable.
1. Rule 2(e) Action.-In cases involving unacceptable per-
formance, the Commission has the authority under Rule 2(e) of its
Rules of Practice to bar an individual or firm from practice before
the Commission. 7 It may also suspend the professional from Com-
mission practice until an appropriate showing of fitness to practice
has been made. The ultimate sanction of a permanent bar is not
frequently used, since the Commission usually believes that a pro-
fessional firm can take actions to bring its performance up to an
acceptable level and provide the Commission with assurance that
such a level is being maintained. Even when an accountant has been
barred from practice before the Commission, his right to practice
may be reinstated after the passage of time, usually upon a showing
that he no longer poses a danger to the public.
2. Quality Control Review and Inspection.-Over the years
the Commission has attempted to use sanctions which will meet the
needs presented in each particular case. In the past two years, new
sanctions have been developed in consent situations that the Com-
mission believes hold some promise. Where cases raise questions
concerning the adequacy of an accounting firm's quality control
procedures, the Commission may require the firm to submit its
procedures to the Commission's staff or to a group of outside profes-
sionals for review. As a result of this review, the firm and the Com-
mission agree on certain quality control and audit procedures to be
followed. Such procedures may emphasize particular areas of prac-
tice that relate to the specific enforcement action, but they are
generally not limited to such areas. After agreement on procedures,
the firm undertakes to have its subsequent practice inspected for a
period of time by a group of its peers in professional practice to
determine whether the standards are adequate and whether they are
being implemented. This inspection team reports its findings to the
Commission, which retains jurisdiction of the matter until the final
report is received and evaluated. If the report is not satisfactory,
further action is required. Although this sanction has a number of
variants tailored to particular situations, it certainly is not a pana-
cea, and may not be appropriate in every case. The Commission
believes, however, that it will have the effect of promoting improved
7. SEC Rules of Practice 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1974).
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professional performance, and has been working closely with the
AICPA on this program.
In one case where this sanction was imposed, it appears that it
had a beneficial effect in improving the firm's operating procedures
and controls. In addition, the existence of an outside inspection
team aided the senior management of the firm in upgrading the
firm's professional practice. It is important, however, not to overem-
phasize the value of this program, because it is apparent that the
attitudes of people and their training are of greater importance in
assuring general audit excellence than are formal control proce-
dures. Clearly, it is not productive to load a mountain of review on
a pinhead of audit field work.
3. Limiting New Firm Business.-In addition to the inspec-
tion sanction, in some cases the Commission has imposed a partial
or complete limitation on new SEC business for a firm, either for a
prescribed period or until such time as a peer review group is able
to inspect a practice and report thereon to the Commission. In this
way the Commission feels it has obtained outside evidence that the
program has been effectively implemented before the firm is allowed
to grow further, either in the aggregate or in the areas that are
affected most. Since the establishment of improved control proce-
dures and the need for extended training of personnel will necessar-
ily require the commitment of substantial managerial and personnel
resources, it may be appropriate to require that when evidence of
control problems arises, growth should be substantially curtailed
until there is independent evidence that such problems are effec-
tively eliminated. This seems. particularly appropriate in cases
where the problems have not been of a limited nature but have
encompassed several areas of practice.
The Commission will continue to monitor the results of these
sanctions and to appraise their success in achieving better financial
reporting and auditing. As new situations are confronted that re-
quire different solutions, the Commission will try to develop addi-
tional approaches to the problem of sanctions.
B. Review of the Reviewers
While it is appropriate to consider the Commission's enforce-
ment program in terms of broad objectives, it is also important that
the program be a fair one to specific firms and individuals affected
in each separate case. I believe that adequate safeguards to insure
fairness do exist in the procedures followed by the staff and the
Commission, and although various parties may disagree with con-
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clusions reached, the judgments made are based on a full considera-
tion of the facts, including, if desired, written presentations from
the proposed defendant.'
At each stage in the process of bringing a case, review of staff
actions takes place at the Commission level. When the staff initially
concludes that a situation warrants investigation to determine
whether an enforcement action is needed, it must present the basis
for this judgment to the Commission and request a formal order of
investigation under which documents and witnesses may be subpoe-
naed. Such an order is not issued unless the Commission is per-
suaded that a reasonable basis exists for the investigation.
When an order is issued, the investigation is undertaken with
due regard for the rights of all. Any person being questioned has the
right to counsel and is fully informed of his rights by the staff.
Accountants from the Division of Enforcement staff are involved
early in the procedure when financial statments are part of the
investigation.
In many cases, during the early stages of an investigation the
staff is not fully aware of the facts that ultimately are developed
and, accordingly, it is not always clear whether the professional
accountant is a potential defendant. Nevertheless, where the profes-
sional accountant and his counsel seek information, the staff will
attempt to advise them of the progress of the investivation to the
extent it is feasible to do so. Moreover, during the course of the
investigation the professional may make a submission setting forth
his view of the case. Any submission made is furnished to the Chief
Accountant and to the Commission. Representatives of the Office
of the Chief Accountant are frequently consulted by the Division of
Enforcement and regional office staffs as an investigation proceeds
so that any questions concerning auditing and accounting can be
answered in the course of the investigation.
Before a case involving an accountant is sent to the Commis-
sion, it is submitted to the Chief Accountant for review on the
merits. At this time, the Assistant Chief Accountant (Investiga-
tions) in the Office of the Chief Accountant generally reviews the
testimony and other evidence and reports his conclusion to the Chief
Accountant. In many cases the proposed defendant will request a
meeting with the Chief Accountant to discuss the case, and, if
thought desirable by the staff, this meeting will be held before any
recommendation is forwarded to the Commission. After careful re-
view of the evidence, the Chief Accountant then makes his recom-
8. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (1974).
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mendation which is submitted to the Commission along with the
recommendation of the Division of Enforcement. In my tenure with
the Commission, no case against an accountant has been brought
without my concurrence. If the case involves novel or particularly
difficult questions, the Commission's Office of General Counsel will
also review the recommendations.
After recommendations have been sent to the Commission to-
gether with any submissions by proposed defendants, the Commis-
sioners and their legal assistants review the case with great care.
The staff will frequently receive questions about details in connec-
tion with this review. Then the case is discussed at the Commission
table before any decision is reached, and these discussions are sub-
stantive in nature. The staff is subjected to vigorous questioning,
and the principles and objectives underlying the proposed action are
considered in depth.
All of these procedures occur prior to an action being brought
by the Commission, since it is recognized that the bringing of an
action against a professional has a substantial impact on his reputa-
tion even before any judicial determination is made. After the ac-
tion is brought, of course, the normal due process of the legal system
is still available to provide protection against unjust actions.
While virtually all Commission cases are civil in character, on
rare occasions it is concluded that a case is sufficiently serious that
it should be referred to the Department of Justice for consideration
of criminal prosecution. Referrals in regard to accountants have
only been made when the Commission and the staff believed that
the evidence indicated that a professional accountant certified fi-
nancial statements that he knew to be false when he reported on
them. The Commission does not make criminal references in cases
that it believes are simply matters of professional judgment, even
if the judgments appear to be bad ones.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Commission's enforcement program in regard to profes-
sional accountants is one of the means by which it seeks to improve
the quality and reliability of financial reporting in the United
States. Effective utilization of this program can achieve an increas-
ing quality of professional performance and the implementation on
an industry-wide basis of improved quality control procedures,
thereby assuring the vitality of auditing standards and public con-
fidence in the profession as a whole. These objectives are being
achieved through a selective, albeit vigorous, application of enforce-
[Vol. 28
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ment powers and the continued use of flexible and innovative ap-
proaches by the SEC. While the accounting profession may some-
times feel that it has been damaged by this effort, I am confident
that in the long run the profession has in fact been strengthened in
performing its essential function for the investing public and the
free capital market system.

